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The paper describes the Swedish wage distribution and how it correlates with worker mobility and
plant-specific factors. It is well known that wage inequality has increased in Sweden since the mid-1980s.
However, little evidence has so far been available as to whether this development reflects increased
dispersion between plants, between individuals in the same plant, or both. We use a new linked employer-employee
data set and discover that a trend rise in between-plant wage inequality account for the entire increase
in wage dispersion. This pattern, which remains when we control for observable individual human
capital characteristics, may reflect increased sorting of workers by skill levels and/or increased scope
















Department of Economics, Box 513
751 20 Uppsala, SWEDEN
bertil.holmlund@nek.uu.se  2 
￿￿ ,QWURGXFWLRQ￿
Over  the  period  lasting  from  the  late  1960s  to  the  mid-1980s,  Sweden 
experienced a sharp decline in wage inequality. Overall wage inequality fell 
along with educational wage differentials and wage differentials between young 
and older workers. This development came to a halt in the mid-1980s and the 
subsequent  years  have  seen  a  reversal  of  previous  trends.  The  rise  in  wage 
inequality since the mid-1980s has been particularly marked for private sector 
workers (le Grand et al, 2001).  
The causes of the fall of Swedish wage inequality have been discussed in 
Edin and Holmlund (1995), Hibbs (1990) and other contributions. Institutional 
factors  almost  certainly  played  a  role.  The  so  called  solidarity  wage  policy 
pursued  by  the  major  trade  union  confederation  was  clearly  attempting  to 
reduce  wage  differentials  and  appeared  to  have  been  successful  in  these 
ambitions. However, there is also evidence that the usual supply and demand 
factors played some role, in particular concerning the evolution of educational 
wage  differentials.  Changes  in  the  university  wage premium  (college  versus 
high  school)  are  strongly  negatively  correlated  with  changes  in  the  relative 
supply of university educated people in the labor force up to the mid-1990s. 
From the mid-1990s, however, this pattern no longer holds. The university wage 
premium has continued to increase despite a continuous increase in the relative 
supply of university educated people in the labor force (Gustavsson, 2004). 
Earlier studies of changes in Swedish wage inequality have been silent on 
the  question  as  to  what  extent  the  changes  are  attributable  to  changes  in 
dispersion between and within firms or plants. The main contribution of the 
present paper is to document how wage dispersion between and within plants 
has evolved since the mid-1980s. We use hitherto largely unexploited data and 
find a continuous rise in between-plant wage inequality. This development may 
reflect increased sorting of workers by skill levels so that high-skilled and low-
skilled  workers  to  a  greater  extent  are  found  in  different  plants.  Another 
possibility is that the importance of rent sharing at the plant level has increased, 
perhaps reflecting stronger local unions or more scope for differential wage 
outcomes due to a greater between-plant variation in the ability to pay. Our data 
do not allow clean tests of alternative hypotheses but they suggest that both 
sorting and genuine plant effects may have become more important.    3
 
Our  paper  also  includes  a  fairly  detailed  descriptive  analysis  of  the 
associations between worker mobility at the plant level and various measures of 
wage  inequality  within  and  between  plants.  This  analysis  confirms  some 
wellknown stylized facts: most mobility takes place in the lower part of the 
plant’s wage distribution, both in terms of exit and entry; mobility rates are 
strongly pro-cyclical; and smaller plants experience higher mobility.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin in section 2 by giving a brief 
overview of the Swedish labor market institutions, the turbulent macroeconomic 
events of the 1990s and evolution of labor mobility and fixed-term contracts as 
a background to the analysis of wages and mobility later in the paper. Section 3 
describes the data, section 4 provides snapshots of plant wages and mobility and 
section 5 portrays in some detail the evolution of the wage structure. Section 6 




Swedish  legislation  on  employment  protection  dates  back  to  the  1974 
Employment Protection Act, which has remained largely intact over the past 
three decades. The law presumes that an employment contract is valid until 
further notice, unless stated otherwise. An employer must provide a valid reason 
for terminating a contract. “Lack of work” is valid reason and the employer’s 
assessment  of  whether  there  is  lack  of  work  can  not  be  disputed  in  court. 
Layoffs  have  to  be  notified  to  workers  several  months  ahead  of  their 
implementation  and  must,  in  general,  proceed  according  to  seniority.  No 
redundancy  pay  is  stipulated  in  the  law  although  such  pay  may  be  part  of 
employer-union deals at the plant level. 
The legislation allows for temporary (fixed-term) contracts. For example, the 
law has always permitted the use of temporary contracts to replace an absent 
                                                       
1 This section draws on various sources, in particular Holmlund (2006) and Holmlund and Storrie 
(2002).   4 
worker. Another common form of temporary contract involves project work in 
construction or research. Contracts for probationary periods are also allowed.  
During the 1990s there have been no significant reforms of the Employment 
Protection Act concerning the termination of open-ended contracts. There have, 
however,  been  several  changes  to  the  statutory  regulation  of  fixed-term 
contracts. In January 1994 the maximum permitted duration for probationary 
contracts and those motivated by a temporary increase in labour demand were 
prolonged from six to twelve months. However, this was immediately repealed 
in  January  1995.  The  reforms  of  1997  were  arguably  more  important.  The 
employer was now given the opportunity to hire for a fixed duration without 
having to specify a particular reason. However, an employer could only use a 
maximum  of  five  such  contracts  and  a  particular  individual  could  not  be 
employed under such a contract for more than twelve months during a three-
year period. If the plant is newly established, the period may be extended to 18 
months.  
Another important element of the 1997 law was the opportunity to strike 
collective agreements on derogations from statutory law regarding fixed-term 
contracts at the local level, provided that the parties had a central agreement in 
other matters. Prior to 1997, these agreements could only be made at the central 
level. 
Comparisons with employment protection in other countries suggest that the 
Swedish  legislation  is  neither  very  stringent,  not  very  liberal.  The  OECD-
comparisons concerning ”employment flexibility” rank Sweden as number 18 
among 26 countries. By this ranking Sweden would be less flexible than, for 
example, the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom, but more flexible 
than France and Germany (see OECD, 1999). 
￿￿￿￿ &ROOHFWLYH￿EDUJDLQLQJ￿
Union density in Sweden has hovered above or around 80 percent of the number 
of  employees  over  the  past  couple  of  decades.  The  coverage  of  collective 
agreements is even higher as the collective agreements typically are extended to 
non-union workers. The trend decline of union density visible in many countries 
has been conspicuously absent in Sweden. A high degree of union membership 
is an integral part of what has been referred to as the Swedish Model. Indeed, 
labor  legislation  concerning  employment  protection  and  worker  co-
determination is based on the presumption that the overwhelming majority of 
the workers are union members.    5
The fact that the provision of unemployment insurance is closely linked to 
union  membership  is  almost  certainly  an  important  explanation  of  the  high 
unionization rate. Three other Nordic countries with very high union density – 
Denmark, Finland and Iceland – also organize their unemployment insurance 
through union-affiliated insurance funds. There is by now a reasonable amount 
of  evidence  suggesting  that  such  institutional  details  explain  some  of  the 
country differences in unionization (see e.g. Boeri et al, 2001). 
Post-war wage determination in Sweden has frequently been associated with 
centralized  wage  bargaining  as  well  as  so-called  solidarity  wage  policy. 
Nationwide coordination of wage negotiations was implemented from the mid-
1950s  and  continued  for  almost  three  decades.  The  key  players  in  these 
negotiations  were  LO  (the  Swedish  trade  union  confederation)  and  SAF 
(Swedish employers’ federation). The guiding principle for LO’s wage policy, 
as laid out in several influential documents by their economists Gösta Rehn and 
Rudolf  Meidner,  was  “equal  pay  for  equal  work”.  One  implication  of  this 
principle was that wages should not be made dependent on the ability to pay 
among particular plants or industries. In theory, the policy recognized the need 
for  wage  differentials  among  workers  so  as  to  reflect  differences  in 
qualifications. In practice, there was always a clear egalitarian ambition in LO’s 
wage demands. 
The centralized wage negotiations came under increasing stress during the 
late 1970s when some employer organizations argued that the central frame 
agreements left too little room for flexibility at the local and industry level. A 
significant  step  towards  more  decentralized  wage  bargaining  came  in  1983, 
when the metalworkers’ union and their employer counterpart sidestepped the 
national negotiations and opted for an industry agreement. Wage negotiations 
after 1983 have mainly taken place at the industry level, albeit with exceptions 
in the early 1990s when double-digit inflation and an emerging macroeconomic 
crisis led the government to initiate a coordinated “stabilization drive” so as to 
achieve  a  deceleration  of  wage  inflation.  The  drive  took  the  form  of  a 
government-appointed commission that delivered a proposal for economy-wide 
wage restraint for the period 1991-93. This involved negotiations with over 100 
organizations  and  the  proposal  was  finally  accepted  across  the  whole  labor 
market.  The  following  years  involved  a  return  to  largely  uncoordinated 
industry-wide bargaining. 
In  the  summer  of  1996,  several  blue-collar  unions  in  the  manufacturing 
sector launched an important initiative that eventually materialized as the so-  6 
called Industrial Agreement (IA) of 1997. The agreement was struck by the 
blue- and white-collar unions as well as employer organizations in the industrial 
sector and was mainly concerned with procedural “rules of the game”. It rep-
resented an attempt to establish consensus around timetables for negotiations, 
the role of mediators, and rules for conflict resolution. A group of “impartial 
chairs” have been appointed and the agreement states rules for when and how 
these chairs could intervene in the negotiation process.  
The Industrial Agreement has served as a model for similar agreements in 
the public sector (and also in parts of the service sector). As of 2002, over 50 
percent of the labor force is covered by IA-type agreements. IA also came to 
serve as a model for government policies concerning industrial relations. A new 
national mediation institute (Medlingsinstitutet) has been created (in operation 
from June 2000) with the power to appoint mediators even without the consent 
of the parties concerned.  
The IA innovations that emerged in the late 1990s represent a move towards 
more  informal  coordination  in  wage  bargaining.  Perhaps  paradoxically,  the 
move towards informal macro-coordination in wage bargaining has taken place 
simultaneously  with  a  clear  shift  towards  stronger  local  influence  over  the 
distribution of wage increases. Pay setting in the public sector is a case in point. 
Previous rigid wage scales have been abandoned and there is, at least in theory, 
substantial room for wage adjustments tailored to the needs of recruiting and 
retaining employees.  
￿￿￿￿ 7KH￿PDFURHFRQRP\￿LQ￿WXUPRLO￿￿
During the 1980s, Swedish labor market performance was widely appreciated as 
a remarkable success story. Whereas unemployment in Western Europe climbed 
to double-digit figures, the Swedish unemployment rate remained exceptionally 
low  by  international  standards.  The  average  unemployment  rate  during  the 
1980s was around 2 percent and by the end of the decade it had fallen to 1.5 
percent.  Employment-to-population  rates  were  also  exceptionally  high  by 
international standards. In 1990, total employment had risen to 83 percent of the 
working age population, whereas the average European figure was 61 percent 
and the OECD average 65 percent.  
In  the  early  1990s,  the  picture  of  outstanding  Swedish  labor  market 
performance  changed  dramatically.  Between  1990  and  1993,  unemployment 
increased from 1.6 percent to 8.2 percent and total employment declined to 73 
percent of working age population (see Table 1). The level of GDP fell from   7
peak to trough by 6 percent over a three year period. For five successive years 
in the mid-1990s, official unemployment was stuck at around 8 percent whereas 
extended measures of unemployment reached double-digit figures.  
 
7DEOH￿￿￿Macroeconomic conditions. 
  Economic growth




1 Year  2 Year  5 Year 
1980  2.0  79.9  1.67  5.57  6.83 
1981  2.5  79.4  -0.19  1.47  5.51 
1982  3.2  79.1  1.24  1.05  8.55 
1983  3.5  79.0  1.88  3.14  8.68 
1984  3.1  79.4  4.31  6.27  9.18 
1985  2.8  80.3  2.22  6.62  9.77 
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
1987  2.1  81.4  3.40  6.28  15.45 
1988  1.7  82.2  2.60  6.09  16.27 
1989  1.5  82.9  2.75  5.42  14.53 
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
1991  3.0  81.0  -1.08  -0.06  8.94 
1992  5.2  77.3  -1.18  -2.25  4.11 
1993  8.2  72.6  -2.00  -3.15  -0.56 
1994  8.0  71.5  4.16  2.09  0.82 
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
1996  8.1  71.6  1.29  5.40  6.32 
1997  8.0  70.7  2.44  3.76  10.22 
1998  6.5  71.5  3.65  6.17  16.56 
1999  5.6  72.9  4.58  8.39  17.03 
￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
2001  4.0  75.3  0.92  5.29  16.91 
Notes: 
AShare of labour force.
BShare of working aged (16-64) population.
C Change in real GDP. 
Numbers in bold￿refer to the years studied in section 4. 
 
Why did Swedish unemployment rise so sharply in the early 1990s? It can be 
argued that the main causes were a series of adverse macroeconomic shocks, 
partly  self-inflicted  by  bad  policies  and  partly  caused  by  unfavorable 
international  developments.  The  policy  failures  date  back  to  the  1970s  and 
include an inability to pursue a sufficiently restrictive aggregate demand policy   8 
so  as  to  bring  inflation  under  control.  This  inflationary  bias  in  policy  was 
especially  pronounced  in  the  late  1980s  when  it  was  fueled  by  financial 
liberalization. The timing of financial liberalization and a major tax reform in 
1990-91, which contributed to a slump in the housing market, was not well 
designed.  When  macroeconomic  policy  finally  took  a  firm  anti-inflationary 
stand in 1991, the economy was already edging towards recession. The depth of 
the recession was reinforced by the international recession of the early 1990s 
and by increasing real interest rates. 
Although the prospects for a sustained labor market improvement appeared 
remote in the mid-1990s, a strong recovery was in fact around the corner. From 
1997 and onwards, employment exhibited a marked increase and unemployment 
fell precipitously. By the end of 2000, unemployment had reached 4 percent of 
the labor force and it remained fairly constant at this level during 2001 and 
2002. To some degree, this recovery reflects the unwinding of earlier shocks 
and a return to what may be close to the equilibrium unemployment rate. There 
is little doubt that the extremely low unemployment rate around 1990s was not 
sustainable. Over the 1990s, several reforms may have facilitated to return to 
lower  equilibrium  unemployment.  For  example,  unemployment  insurance 
became less generous, a number of deregulations in product markets took place, 
and labor market reforms opened up for temporary work agencies. 
￿￿￿￿ /DERU￿PRELOLW\￿DQG￿WHPSRUDU\￿FRQWUDFWV￿
Available measures of labor mobility in Sweden reveal strong cyclical patterns. 
However, any statements about cycles versus trends are problematic considering 
the exceptionally deep and prolonged slump of the early 1990s. A noticeable 
change is the rapid growth of fixed-term employment contracts. 
One source of information on labor mobility is the retrospective labor force 
surveys.  Data  on  external  job  mobility  –  change  of  employer  at  least  once 
during the past year – reveal annual mobility rates hovering between 6 and 12 
percent since the mid-1960s. There is some evidence that internal mobility – 
change  of  position  without  changing  employer  –  has  shown  a  slight  trend 
increase, at least up to the late 1980s. 
Overall labor turnover has been markedly pro-cyclical, with quits accounting 
for the overwhelming share of the total number of worker separations. For blue   9
collar workers in mining and manufacturing, the annual quit rate amounted to 
22 percent over the period 1968-1988, to be compared with an average annual 
layoff rate of only 2 percent.
2 The importance of layoffs increased substantially 
during the slump of the 1990s, but separate data on quits and layoffs are not 
available after 1988. Other evidence, such as information on unemployment 
inflow and advance notification of layoffs, indicates sharply rising layoff rates 
in the early 1990s. 
The distinction between quits and layoffs is often fuzzy, and especially fuzzy 
for fixed-term contracts which have grown relentlessly during the 1990s. As 
shown in Figure 1, the sharp fall in total employment in the early 1990s was due 
to sharply falling employment in open-ended contracts. The number of fixed-
term contracts stood at approximately the same level in the first quarter of 1994 
as it did four years earlier. When the economy approached the cyclical peak in 
the late 1980s, we observe rising permanent employment along with a decline in 
the number of fixed-term contracts. From the early 1990s and during most of 
the rest of the decade there is a remarkable increase in fixed-term contracts that 
amounts  to  roughly  50  percent.  Measured  relative  to  total  wage  and  salary 
employment,  the  number  of  temporary  workers  rose  from  10  percent  to  16 
percent; see Figure 2. Note, however, the declining share of fixed-term contracts 
in the late 1980s and the late 1990s, periods with falling unemployment.
3 
 
                                                       
2  Quits  are  worker  separations  “initiated  by  the  employee”  whereas  layoffs  are  separations 
“initiated  by  the  employer”.  The  data  are  based  on  surveys  to  firms  and  were  collected  by 
Statistics Sweden. Empirical studies of worker mobility in Sweden up to the early 1980s are 
reported in Holmlund (1984). 
3 Fixed-term contracts account for a much higher share of the total flow of new hires than of the total 
stock of employment. Available data for the private sector reveal that fixed-term contracts accounted 
for roughly 50 percent of all new hires in the late 1980s. By the late 1990s, they accounted for some 
70 percent. 










































)LJXUH￿￿ Wage and salary employment (100s) by type of contract, seasonally 
adjusted quarterly data 1987Q1 – 2004Q2. (6RXUFH: Labor force surveys, 
Statistics Sweden.) 











































)LJXUH￿￿ Temporary work (percent of total wage and salary employment) and 
unemployment (percent of the labor force), seasonally adjusted quarterly data 
1987Q1 – 2004Q2. (6RXUFH: Labor force surveys, Statistics Sweden.) 
 
The prevalence of fixed-term contracts is particularly visible among women, 
the young and foreign-born residents. By the turn of the century, 18 percent of 
the female employees were on fixed-term contracts, a figure to be compared 
with 13 percent for the male employees. The trend rise in temporary work is 
striking for both men and women. Among young female workers aged 16-24, 
close to  60  percent  were in temporary  work  by  the  end  of  the century; the 
corresponding share for young men was around 40 percent.  
Temporary work has increased in every broad sector of the economy. Two 
sectors  stand  out.  Financial  and  Business  services  exhibit  both  the  greatest 
increase in fixed-term contract rate and share of all fixed-term contracts while 
Health and Care show the lowest growth rates in both these figures.  
The  most  frequent  form  of  fixed-term  contracts  involves  replacement  of 
absent  workers.  Sweden  has  generous  allowance  for  many  forms  of  leave, 
particularly parental leave and long statutory holidays. The incidence of leave   12
replacements has, however, remained roughly constant at around 4-5 percent of 
total  wage  and  salary  employment.  The  entire  rise  in  temporary  work  is 
accounted  for  by  other  categories,  viz.  on-call  contracts,  project  work  and 
probationary employment.  
Why did fixed-term contracts exhibit such rapid growth during the 1990s? 
Holmlund and Storrie (2002) discuss this issue and conclude that legislative 
changes  are  unlikely  to  be  crucial.  Changes  in  the  industrial  structure  of 
employment,  or  in  the  demographic  composition  of  the  labor  force,  have 
likewise negligible explanatory power. A more promising explanation focuses 
on  the  consequences  of  adverse  macroeconomic  conditions.  A  recession  is 
associated  with  relatively  more  hirings  on  temporary  contracts,  reflecting 
weaker incentives on part of firms to offer long-term contracts when workers 
are easier to find as well as an increased willingness on part of workers to 
accept  temporary  work  when  job  offers  are  in  short  supply.  The  Swedish 
experience as well as the developments of temporary work in the other Nordic 
countries lends support to this hypothesis. The share of temporary work has 
been  relatively  stable  in  Norway  (with  stable  or  falling  unemployment)  but 
increased  sharply  in  Finland  over  the  1990s,  i.e.,  a  period  when  Finnish 
unemployment skyrocketed.  
The trend rise in temporary work over the 1990s may thus to a significant 
degree reflect changes in the macroeconomic environment, and in particular the 
rise in unemployment from the exceptionally low (and unsustainable) levels in 
the late 1980s to the much higher (and presumably sustainable) levels prevailing 
in  recent  years.  In  addition,  other  more  “structural”  forces  may  have  tilted 
employers’ preferences towards more flexible staffing arrangements but it is 
difficult to pinpoint the exact causes. Hiring labor on a fixed-term contract can 
accommodate fluctuations in the workload associated with a volatile market 
environment but evidence on LQFUHDVHG volatility is hard to come by.
4 
 
                                                       
4 Houseman (2001) reports from a survey of US employers that flexible staffing arrangements are 
mainly used to accommodate fluctuations in workload or absences.   13
￿￿ 'DWD￿
In order to study wage dispersion, wage changes and mobility, we use a linked 
employer-employee data base containing information on all workers and plants 
in both the private and public sectors. From the data base we derive measures of 
wage  levels,  wage  changes,  mobility  and  tenure.  Through  the  employer-
employee link we are able to derive plant aggregates of these measures as well 
as measures of wage dispersion at the plant level. In addition to these core 
measures we also use information on observable characteristics (age, gender, 
immigrant status and education) of the workers. 
The basic data source is a version of a register data base (RAMS) provided 
by Statistics Sweden. RAMS contains yearly plant-level data on all workers that 
were employed at a plant some time during each year, irrespectively of whether 
were  employed  on  a  fixed-term  or  a  permanent  contract.  The  data  include 
information on total annual earnings as well as the first and the last remunerated 
month for each employee. We construct monthly wage data by dividing total 
earnings during the year by the number of remunerated months, including only 
employment spells that cover November each year. Thus, we use the average 
monthly wage-bill paid to an employee by a single employer as our measure of 
the employee’s wage.  
The  data  is  yearly  and  cover  the  period  1985-2000.  The  underlying 
population  consists  of  all  individuals  aged  16-65  who  resided  in  Sweden 
anytime between 1990 and 2000. This implies that the oldest workers as well as 
workers that emigrated or died before 1990 are missing during the first five 
years. Thus, in effect, we have an age restriction of 16-60 in 1985 and 16-64 in 
1989. 
The data do not contain information on hours worked so in order to focus on 
workers that are reasonably close to full time employment we consider a person 
to  be  full-time  employed  if  and  only  if  the  wage  for  November  exceeds  a 
minimum wage.
5 Furthermore, an individual is only counted as employed by at 
most one plant each year with priority given to the observation generating the 
highest wage. 
                                                       
5 The minimum wage is defined as 75 percent of the mean wage of janitors employed by local 
municipalities according to Statistics Sweden’s information on monthly wages, the cut-offs are 
available upon request.   14
7DEOH￿￿ The importance of extreme values (2000). 
    Log of nominal monthly wage in 2000    




95  9.820  0.283  10.54 
99  9.855  0.328  10.98 
99.5  9.862  0.338  11.19 
99.9  9.868  0.351  11.75 
All  9.870  0.359  15.07 
Note: Total sample size is 3,040,555 individuals. 
 
The dataset is based on information on total labor earnings collected for the 
purpose  of  calculating  taxes.  Thus,  the  data  include  the  earnings  of  DOO￿
employees, including top CEO’s, which implies that some of the observations 
are extreme outliers. It should be noted that there is great persistence over time 
in the recorded wages of these individuals, suggesting that the extreme values 
are not due to errors. As is evident from Table 2, the wages of the top earners 
have a large impact on the standard deviation of monthly wages while the mean 
hardly is affected at all (this pattern is of course even more noticeable when 
looking at wages in levels). It might be misleading if a very small number of 
workers  influence  the  statistics  in  such  a  dramatic  way,  especially  when 
comparing to other data sets where this group may be excluded by construction. 
On the other hand, wages of top earners within each plant are in the focus of 
parts of the paper. Considering this, we retain all but the top 0.5 percent in the 
wage distribution in the relevant years. In an effort to reduce the impact of 
measurement errors in changes we also rank individuals according to their log 
wage change and drop the highest and lowest half-percentile each year. 
Table 3 compares the constructed wage distribution to the “actual” wage 
distribution  calculated  from  the  3  percent  random  sample  in  the  LINDA-
database (see Edin and Fredriksson, 2000). The constructed data correspond 
reasonably close to the actual data when looking at log wages but appear to 
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7DEOH￿￿ Actual and constructed nominal monthly wages (2000). 
    Log (wages)   
Changes in log wage  
(from 1999) 
  Constructed  Actual  Constructed  Actual 
Mean  9.860  9.876  0.051  0.054 
Standard deviation  0.336  0.283  0.149  0.116 
10
th percentile  9.453  9.585  -0.093  -0.022 
Median  9.821  9.818  0.042  0.037 
90
th percentile  10.309  10.258  0.216  0.165 
N  2,999,065  105,633  2,602,351  88,864 
Note: The observations with the largest (and smallest for the actual data) 0.5 % of wages as well 
as the largest and smallest 0.5 % of log wage changes are excluded from the data.  
 
The  individual  identifiers  are  based  on  official  personal  identification 
numbers which should be very accurate and consistent over time. However, 
plant identifiers may change over time for administrative reasons. In order not 
to  misclassify  the  disappearance  of  administrative  plant  numbers  as  plant 
closings, we only include plants that existed in two consecutive years when 
studying  changes  (and,  for  comparability,  throughout  section  4).  Thus,  the 
calculated exit rates (i.e. the fraction of employees in a plant that leave within a 
year) does not include plant closings. Since our tenure variable is calculated 
within the sample, changes in administrative plant numbers will probably mean 
that we underestimate the fraction of long tenured workers. When calculating 
wage  changes  for  people  that  change  plants,  we  only  include  people  that 
changed between plants with at least 25 employees in both years in order to get 
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7DEOH￿￿ Sector and size. 
￿ Relative size of sector 
(# Employees)       
￿￿￿￿ 
All plants and 
employees 
Employees in 
size 25+ plants 
only 
Share of all employees in sector 
working in size 25+ plants 
All corporate  0.63  0.62  0.59 
3ULYDWH￿
FRUSRUDWH
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 0.55 
Public and 
non-profit 
0.37  0.38  0.63 
￿￿￿￿￿      
All corporate  0.66  0.62  0.57 
3ULYDWH￿
FRUSRUDWH
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ 0.55 
Public and 
non-profit 
0.34  0.38  0.68 
Note: Size is the total number of employees each year.  
 
Our  analysis  is  focused  on  the  corporate  sector,  and  in  order  to  get  a 
meaningful description of the wage dispersion within establishments we include 
only plants with at least 25 employees.
6 Table 4 displays the relative size of the 
corporate  sector  for  the  years  1985  and  2000.
7  We  include  both  a  measure 
where we use the entire corporate sector and one where we restrict the analysis 
to the private corporations. It is shown that the size of the corporate sector, as 
measured in number of employees, increased slightly between 1985 and 2000 
(from 63 to 66 percent). 
Table 4 also shows the share of workers in each sector that worked in plants 
with at least 25 employees. It is shown that 59 percent of individuals employed 
in the corporate sector in 2000 worked in 25+ sized plants; the corresponding 
number for 1985 was 57 percent. Figure 3 shows the log plant-size distribution 
for 2000. It is obvious that most 25+ sized plants have close to 25 employees, 
and as a consequence, a significant fraction of plants move around the 25 limit 
                                                       
6 The main reason is to get comparability with other studies in the volume for which this text is 
intended. 
7 The sector definitions are based on SCB (2001) and SCB (2002) and comply with EU-standard 
classifications.   17
between years. However, as noted above, we will condition on plants having at 
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This section provides detailed descriptive evidence of wages, wage changes and 
mobility at the plant level in the Swedish private corporate sector for the years 
1986,  1990,  1995  and  2000.  The  purpose  of  the  analysis  is  to  provide  an 
overview  of  the  role  of  plants  in  shaping  wages,  wage  changes  and  labor 
mobility in Sweden since the 1980s in order to facilitate comparisons with other   18
countries and depict the most important changes that have occurred during the 
period under study.  
The  analysis  is  based  only  on  plants  in  SULYDWHO\￿ RZQHG  firms  in  the 
corporate sector. It is worth noting that the period under study was characterized 
by  a  steady  increase  in  the  share  of  workers  in  private  plants  within  the 
corporate sector: in 1986 only 77 percent of workers worked in plants owned by 
private firms,  whereas  the  corresponding  share  was  87 percent in  2000  (see 
Table 4).  
Since the focus of this section is on describing the pattern and changes in 
wages and turnover at the plant level, most statistics are calculated with one 
plant as one observation implying that all included plants have an equal weight. 
Thus,  small  plants  are  up-weighted  compared  to  an  analysis  based  on 
individuals. 
￿￿￿￿ :DJH￿OHYHOV￿
Figure 4 shows the log real wage distribution for the four years (wages are 
deflated by the consumer price index). The figure reveals a steady increase in 
real wages, but also an increase in dispersion. This is also shown by the first 
panel of Table 5, where the standard deviation of log wages increases from 
0.307 to o.340 between 1986 and 2000. This reproduces what is a well-known 
fact from several previous studies, namely that the wage dispersion in Sweden 
started to increase in the mid-1980s after several decades of wage compression.
8  
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)LJXUH￿￿ The distribution of log real wages. 
 
The  second  panel  of  Table  5  shows  that  the  EHWZHHQ  plant  dispersion, 
measured as the standard deviation of plant average wages, increased over time. 
As a contrast, the third panel shows that the ZLWKLQ plant dispersion, measured 
as the mean of the within plant standard deviation of wages, remained relatively 
constant  over  time.  This  impression  also  holds  in  the  fourth  panel  showing 
statistics for the coefficient of variation within plants. Thus, it appears as the 
prime source of increased dispersion is between, rather than within, plants. We 
will return to this issue at length in section 5 of the paper. 
The fifth panel of Table 5 reveals a positive correlation between the wage 
OHYHO in a plant and the wage GLVSHUVLRQ within the plant. This result is probably, 
at least partly, driven by the skewness of the wage distribution (see Figure 4   20
above). The wage dispersion among high-paid people is larger even in relative 
terms.
9  
The last two panels of Table 5 show the evolution of wage dispersion for 
young (25-30) and old (45-50) workers. The results show that the increase in 
wage dispersion was larger for young workers than for prime aged workers. 
However, if we compare the log wages of young  wages to the average log 
wages  displayed  in  the  top  panel  we  see  that  youth  wages  appears to  have 
remained relatively stable at approximately 90 percent of the average wage over 
the period. 
 
                                                       
9 Some caution is warranted when comparing these numbers to other data sources since the used 
data are rather unique in including the earnings of all people receiving remuneration from each 
plant, including top CEO’s. Note however that we, as explained in Section 3, excluded the top 0.5 
percent of wages each year.   21
7DEOH￿￿ Structure of wages within and between plants. 
  Wages (1990-SEK)
1     Log wages (1990-SEK)
1 
  1986
2  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
1, Average Wage  12976  13797  14865  17843    9.420  9.477  9.553  9.727 
  (s.d.)  4572  4996  5346  7040    0.307  0.322  0.318  0.340 
90%-ile  18832  20069  21606  26716    9.843  9.907  9.981  10.193 
  75%-ile  14544  15649  16711  20055    9.585  9.658  9.724  9.906 
Median  11848  12696  13668  16070    9.380  9.449  9.523  9.685 
  25%-ile  9992  10525  11462  13437    9.210  9.262  9.347  9.506 
10%-ile  8519  8728  9570  11208    9.050  9.074  9.166  9.324 
  [N – workers]  692870  800332  739378  860581    692870  800332  739378  860581 
2, Plant average wage  12678  13490  14432  17245    9.396  9.455  9.521  9.692 
  (s.d.)  2088  2266  2679  3663    0.145  0.152  0.169  0.188 
90%-ile  15699  16680  18143  22497    9.603  9.664  9.751  9.959 
  75%-ile  13664  14586  15855  19008    9.478  9.541  9.624  9.801 
Median  12228  13076  13935  16397    9.376  9.440  9.505  9.665 
  25%-ile  11239  11953  12554  14698    9.297  9.353  9.407  9.561 
10%-ile  10448  11003  11501  13413    9.227  9.272  9.318  9.472 
  [N – plants]  7047  8306  7526  9067    7047  8306  7526  9067 
3, Plant s.d. of wages  3820  4168  4404  5484    0.266  0.279  0.273  0.279 
  (s.d.)  1387  1416  1626  2222    0.064  0.060  0.066  0.069 
90%-ile  5830  6219  6678  8635    0.355  0.361  0.361  0.371 
  75%-ile  4702  5029  5459  6917    0.308  0.317  0.317  0.326 
Median  3595  3924  4151  5047    0.260  0.274  0.267  0.272 
  25%-ile  2775  3119  3159  3794    0.220  0.238  0.226  0.228 
10%-ile  2206  2546  2474  2936    0.186  0.207  0.192  0.195 
  [N – plants]  7047  8306  7526  9067    7047  8306  7526  9067 
Plant CV of wages  0.296  0.305  0.300  0.312    0.028  0.030  0.029  0.029 
  (s.d.)  0.076  0.072  0.080  0.088    0.007  0.006  0.007  0.007 
90%-ile  0.392  0.399  0.406  0.429    0.037  0.038  0.037  0.038 
  75%-ile  0.349  0.356  0.356  0.371    0.033  0.033  0.033  0.033 
Median  0.294  0.302  0.298  0.306    0.028  0.029  0.028  0.028 
  25%-ile  0.240  0.253  0.242  0.247    0.024  0.025  0.024  0.024 
10%-ile  0.197  0.212  0.196  0.200    0.020  0.022  0.020  0.020 
  [N – plants]  7047  8306  7526  9067    7047  8306  7526  9067 
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7DEOH￿￿ Structure of wages within and between plants (continued). 
  Wages (1990-SEK)
1     Log wages (1990-SEK)
1 
  1986
2  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
4, Correlation(average 
wage, s.d. of wage)   0.782  0.758  0.742  0.768    0.591  0.499  0.480  0.499 
5, Wages for workers 
aged 25 - 30   11910  12716  13318  16258    9.358  9.419  9.467  9.657 
  (s.d.)  2950  3321  3456  4929    0.230  0.249  0.243  0.276 
90%-ile  15521  16772  17305  22121    9.650  9.727  9.759  10.004 
  75%-ile  13293  14381  14994  18364    9.495  9.574  9.615  9.818 
Median  11466  12335  12922  15469    9.347  9.420  9.467  9.647 
  25%-ile  9961  10508  11086  13073    9.206  9.260  9.313  9.478 
10%-ile  8649  8861  9449  11009    9.065  9.089  9.154  9.306 
  [N – workers]  103277  125836  127035  138219    103277  125836  127035  138219 
6, Wages for workers 
aged 45 - 50   14251  15453  16255  19169    9.508  9.585  9.638  9.795 
  (s.d.)  5236  5770  6002  7772    0.327  0.339  0.332  0.351 
90%-ile  21462  23417  24497  29579    9.974  10.061  10.106  10.295 
  75%-ile  16254  17854  18562  21767    9.696  9.790  9.829  9.988 
Median  12820  13974  14680  16948    9.459  9.545  9.594  9.738 
  25%-ile  10773  11600  12304  14193    9.285  9.359  9.418  9.561 
10%-ile  9162  9690  10455  12108    9.123  9.179  9.255  9.402 
  [N – workers]  91500  120626  121496  116080    91500  120626  121496  116080 
Note: Data only include employees of plants with 25+ employees in year W and W-1. 
1Deflation by 
CPI to 1990-SEK. 
2Data for 1986 do not include workers older than 62 or workers that emigrated 
or died before 1990. 
 
￿￿￿￿ :DJH￿FKDQJHV￿
In this subsection we study wage changes within and between plants. In doing 
so, we only look at changes for workers that are employed by plants in the 
sample (i.e. by plants with at least 25 employees in the private corporate sector) 
in two consecutive years. Figure 5 shows the distribution of wage changes for 
the  four  years.  It  can  be  noted that  many  workers  experienced  a real  wage 
decline between 1989 and 1990.  
Table  6  looks  at  wage  changes.  The  top  panel  shows  the  mean  and 
distribution  of  individual  wage  changes:  the  average  real  wage  change  was 
between four and five percent except in 1990 when it was close to zero. As for   23
the dispersion, there appears to be some variation over time, but not much to 
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)LJXUH￿￿. Distribution of log real wage changes. 
 
Figure 6 and the second panel of Table 6 show the distribution of plant 
average wage changes using information on the workers that remained in the 
plant for two consecutive years (from W￿– 1 to W). We see that the dispersion of 
wage changes EHWZHHQ￿plants, as measured by the standard deviation of plant 
wage changes, increased over time. As a contrast, it is shown in the third panel 
that the dispersion of wage changes ZLWKLQ plants (the mean of the standard 
deviation of wage changes within a plant) was relatively stable. Thus, the results 
suggest that the rate of real wage changes increasingly varies between plants, 
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)LJXUH￿￿ Distribution of plant average log wage changes for workers who 
remain in the same plant. 
 
The bottom three panels of Table 6 show the distribution of wage changes 
separately for different tenure groups: (i) for those that changed plants (from 
one plant in the sample to another), (ii) for those with short (1-3 years) tenure, 
and (iii) for long tenured (> 3 years) workers. The tables show, as expected, that 
wage increases are smaller for workers with long tenure than for workers with 
shorter tenure. The wage increases for workers that change plants are smaller 
than average at the start of the period, but larger at the end of the period. This 
observation seems consistent with the observed increase in the importance of 
plant  effects.  However,  it  should  also  be  noted  that  the  dispersion  of  wage 
changes  is  much  larger  for  those  that  change  plants,  suggesting  important 
differences  between  voluntary  and  involuntary  worker  separations.  It  is 
important to keep in mind that the analysis is based on raw differences and that 
the probability of changing plants may be correlated with other characteristics 
that may affect the rate of wage growth, such as age or education.   25
7DEOH￿￿ Wage changes. 
  '￿Wages (1990 SEK:s)
1    '￿ln￿Wages)
  (1990 SEK:s)
1 
  1986
2  1990  1995  2000    1986
2  1990  1995  2000 
1, Change in wages  610  46  638  898    0.048  0.004  0.045  0.048 
(s.d.)  1559  1890  2018  2633    0.124  0.140  0.134  0.142 
90%-ile  2356  2174  2803  3668    0.191  0.164  0.193  0.207 
  75%-ile  1283  922  1428  1826    0.103  0.068  0.098  0.105 
Median  503  -27  476  626    0.040  -0.002  0.034  0.038 
  25%-ile  -108  -830  -195  -177    -0.009  -0.059  -0.014  -0.011 
10%-ile  -956  -1920  -1160  -1434    -0.078  -0.139  -0.079  -0.085 
[N – workers]  586057  665982  623679  704360    586057  665982  623679  704360 
2, Plant wage change
3   666  122  565  948    0.054  0.010  0.041  0.053 
(s.d.)  541  680  799  1141    0.042  0.049  0.053  0.059 
90%-ile  1255  860  1366  2088    0.099  0.063  0.094  0.114 
  75%-ile  914  440  878  1292    0.073  0.033  0.063  0.076 
Median  617  90  484  763    0.052  0.008  0.037  0.047 
  25%-ile  368  -232  162  384    0.032  -0.016  0.014  0.024 
10%-ile  138  -549  -148  30    0.013  -0.039  -0.008  0.001 
  [N – plants]  7037  8296  7521  9063    7037  8296  7521  9063 
3, Within plant s.d.   1402  1713  1738  2197    0.113  0.128  0.120  0.126 
(s.d.)  483  553  690  980    0.029  0.033  0.035  0.039 
90%-ile  2008  2393  2614  3417    0.151  0.170  0.164  0.176 
  75%-ile  1627  1986  2059  2605    0.130  0.147  0.140  0.147 
Median  1322  1632  1615  1975    0.111  0.127  0.117  0.122 
  25%-ile  1078  1346  1275  1553    0.093  0.107  0.096  0.100 
10%-ile  890  1112  1000  1231    0.078  0.089  0.078  0.082 
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7DEOH￿￿ Wage changes (continued). 
  '￿Wages (1990 SEK:s)
1    '￿ln￿Wages)
  (1990 SEK:s)
1 
  1986
2  1990  1995  2000    1986
2  1990  1995  2000 
4, Wage change if 
changed plant  524  -129  742  1069    0.037  -0.015  0.047  0.053 
(s.d.)  2302  2671  3179  4026    0.174  0.194  0.197  0.213 
90%-ile  3243  2979  4382  5727    0.254  0.221  0.292  0.319 
  75%-ile  1703  1358  2347  3133    0.135  0.099  0.155  0.175 
Median  452  -110  664  913    0.035  -0.008  0.044  0.051 
  25%-ile  -700  -1595  -789  -1049    -0.055  -0.122  -0.053  -0.063 
10%-ile  -2168  -3348  -2771  -3525    -0.184  -0.269  -0.195  -0.218 
[N – workers]  23659  28824  21477  40217    23659  28824  21477  40217 
5, Wage change if 
tenure 1-3 years     444  1073  1542      0.037  0.083  0.089 
(s.d.)    1984  2316  2965      0.155  0.163  0.164 
90%-ile    2769  3765  4837      0.228  0.292  0.292 
  75%-ile    1460  2186  2793      0.118  0.165  0.170 
Median    336  845  1178      0.027  0.063  0.073 
  25%-ile    -569  -30  108      -0.044  -0.002  0.007 
10%-ile    -1659  -1046  -1151      -0.128  -0.075  -0.071 
[N – workers]    230789  172967  224083      230789  172967  224083 
6, Wage change if 
tenure > 3 years    -168  458  555      -0.013  0.029  0.027 
(s.d.)    1726  1773  2192      0.121  0.113  0.115 
90%-ile    1635  2213  2637      0.113  0.142  0.141 
  75%-ile    603  1150  1312      0.043  0.078  0.075 
Median    -175  378  446      -0.013  0.027  0.027 
  25%-ile    -915  -233  -252      -0.064  -0.016  -0.015 
10%-ile    -1950  -1131  -1387      -0.136  -0.077  -0.081 
[N – workers]    406369  429235  440060      406369  429235  440060 
Note: Data only include employees of plants with 25+ employees in year W and W-1. 
1Deflation by 
CPI to 1990-SEK. 
2Data for 1986 do not include workers older than 62 or workers that emigrated 
or died before 1990. 
3 Average change in wage (or log wage) for workers that worked in the plant 
in both W and W – 1. 
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￿￿￿￿ 0RELOLW\￿
We now take a look at worker mobility the plant level. The HQWU\￿UDWH￿is defined 
as the share of workers in a plant in year W￿that did not work in the plant in W￿1. 
Correspondingly, the H[LW￿UDWH￿is defined as the share of workers in a plant in 
year W￿￿ that did not remain in the same plant in year W.  
The top panels of Table 7 shows some background statistics. We see an 
increase in the number of plants over time (top panel) and some decrease in the 
average number of employees per plant (the second panel) consistent with the 
declining average plant size we described in section 3. The third panel shows 
the employment growth rates of the plants and by comparing the left part of the 
table (all 25+ sized plants) with the right side (only 100+ sized plants) it is clear 
the smaller plants had higher growth rates than larger plants during this period. 
Comparing the exit rates depending on the size of the plant in the fourth and 
fifth panel we see that there are fewer exits in the largest plants; presumably this 
is because they can provide more career opportunities than smaller organizat-
ions.  
In  the  following  panels  (6  and  below)  we  show  exit  and  entry  rates  for 
different parts of the plant wage distribution. It is clear that most of the mobility 
takes place in the lower part of a plant’s wage distribution, both in terms of exit 
and entry. Exit rates in the top quartile are in the order of 13 to 18 percent 
whereas exit rates in the bottom quartiles are between 26 and 36 percent. The 
corresponding numbers for entry rates are 10 to 14 percent in the top quartile 
and 40 to 44 percent in the bottom quartile. Thus, there is relatively more entry 
than exits at the lower part of the plant wage distribution and relatively more 
exits  than  entry  at  the  higher  part  of  the  wage  distribution  suggesting  that 
workers to some extent enter at lower wage levels and get promoted to higher 
wage levels before leaving the plant.  
The  most  important  development  over  time  seems  to  be  some  pro-
cyclicality, in terms of entry rates and exit rates. In both the (relative) slump 
years of 1986 and 1995 we see that exits as well as entries were relatively 
uncommon  (panels  5  to  16)  and  the  fraction  of  high  tenured  workers  was 
relatively large in 1995 (panel 17).  
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7DEOH￿￿ Mobility, all jobs.  
  All Plants     Plants with 100+ employees  
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
1, Number of plants  7047  8306  7526  9067    1341  1566  1420  1650 
2, Employees/plant  98.3  96.4  98.4  95.2    311.5  303.1  315.3  301.6 
  (s.d.)  232.1  222.6  219.1  206.7    474.3  456.0  441.2  424.4 
3, Employment 
growth/plant  0.015  0.028  0.056  0.059    0.001  -0.006  0.051  0.040 
  (s.d.)  0.241  0.245  0.228  0.319    0.172  0.160  0.193  0.249 
%\￿LQGLYLGXDO￿￿￿D￿SHUVRQ￿LV￿RQH￿REVHUYDWLRQ￿              
4, Exit rate,   0.199  0.217  0.151  0.204    0.182  0.208  0.132  0.186 
If wage > 90%-ile   0.165  0.176  0.174  0.231    0.153  0.167  0.155  0.222 
If wage in 45-55 %-ile  0.135  0.159  0.099  0.142    0.120  0.151  0.081  0.123 
If wage < 10%-ile   0.475  0.457  0.336  0.422    0.462  0.454  0.314  0.403 
%\￿SODQW￿￿￿D￿SODQW￿LV￿RQH￿REVHUYDWLRQ￿              
5, Exit rate  0.202  0.216  0.159  0.212    0.183  0.204  0.136  0.191 
  (s.d.)  0.124  0.124  0.120  0.141    0.107  0.107  0.100  0.124 
6, Exit rate, top quartile 
of plant wages  0.131  0.148  0.127  0.174    0.116  0.139  0.110  0.164 
  (s.d.)  0.147  0.154  0.148  0.174    0.116  0.121  0.111  0.141 
7, Exit rate, bottom 
quartile of plant wages  0.355  0.353  0.259  0.316    0.338  0.349  0.230  0.288 
  (s.d.)  0.190  0.184  0.180  0.194    0.138  0.135  0.131  0.147 
8, Exit rate, top decile of 
plant wages  0.143  0.160  0.148  0.191    0.133  0.154  0.137  0.188 
  (s.d.)  0.192  0.201  0.197  0.224    0.144  0.144  0.142  0.169 
9, Exit rate 45-55 %-ile, 
of plant wages  0.156  0.179  0.127  0.178    0.130  0.159  0.100  0.153 
  (s.d.)  0.201  0.212  0.190  0.218    0.134  0.137  0.121  0.153 
10, Exit rate, bottom 
decile of plant wages  0.454  0.432  0.340  0.396    0.444  0.437  0.314  0.376 
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7DEOH￿￿ Mobility, all jobs (continued).  
  All Plants     Plants with 100+ employees  
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
%\￿SODQW￿￿￿D￿SODQW￿LV￿RQH￿REVHUYDWLRQ￿             
11, Entry rate  0.198  0.221  0.191  0.234    0.176  0.191  0.169  0.209 
  (s.d.)  0.126  0.129  0.127  0.153    0.105  0.102  0.110  0.135 
12, Entry rate, top 
quartile of plant wages  0.103  0.116  0.105  0.144    0.090  0.100  0.096  0.134 
  (s.d.)  0.134  0.140  0.136  0.164    0.102  0.108  0.111  0.137 
13, Entry rate, bottom 
quartile of plant wages  0.398  0.432  0.392  0.438    0.366  0.388  0.353  0.399 
  (s.d.)  0.212  0.212  0.227  0.235    0.169  0.165  0.177  0.199 
14, Entry rate, top decile 
of plant wages  0.112  0.127  0.118  0.159    0.103  0.115  0.115  0.155 
  (s.d.)  0.170  0.182  0.176  0.206    0.121  0.135  0.133  0.161 
15, Entry rate 45-55 %-
ile, of plant wages  0.135  0.156  0.127  0.168    0.112  0.125  0.106  0.142 
  (s.d.)  0.193  0.207  0.189  0.224    0.124  0.125  0.129  0.160 
16, Entry rate, bottom 
decile of plant wages  0.500  0.528  0.502  0.541    0.461  0.478  0.463  0.504 
  (s.d.)  0.288  0.282  0.294  0.295    0.195  0.189  0.198  0.215 
17, percent of workers 
with 5+ years of tenure    0.316  0.414  0.364      0.351  0.459  0.423 
  (s.d.)    0.218  0.262  0.249      0.225  0.257  0.258 
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7DEOH￿￿ Mobility, all jobs (continued).￿
  All Plants     Plants with 100+ employees  
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
18, Correlation (size, 
average tenure)
1     0.072  0.052  0.045      0.092  0.032  0.022 
19, Correlation(size, 
average age)   -0.004  0.014  -0.004  -0.011    -0.063  -0.038  -0.064  -0.035 
20, Correlation (exit rate, 
average wage),   -0.184  -0.166  -0.034  -0.019    -0.136  -0.128  0.037  0.084 
21, Correlation(exit rate, 
average wage change)   0.050  -0.002  0.040  0.181    0.098  -0.028  0.079  0.272 
22, Correlation(exit rate, 
s.d. of wage)   0.054  0.097  0.177  0.215    0.110  0.114  0.299  0.340 
23, Correlation (entry 
rate, average wage),   -0.100  -0.118  -0.051  0.026    -0.107  -0.051  0.021  0.054 
24, Correlation(entry 
rate, average wage 
change),   0.249  0.206  0.249  0.362    0.383  0.199  0.330  0.414 
25, Correlation(entry 
rate, s.d. of wage),   0.110  0.135  0.181  0.239    0.192  0.251  0.248  0.310 
Note: All statistics are at the plant level with one plant as one observation except otherwise noted. 
Separate tables for high and low level jobs can be found in Appendix A. Correlations are with 
average log wages in plants, average log wage changes for workers remaining in the plant, and 
standard deviation of log wages within plants.1 Note that tenure is calculated from 1985 onwards, 
and thus truncated at different values for different years. 
 
The six bottom panels (18 to 25) of Table 7 show correlations between entry 
and  exit  rates  and  different  aspects  of  the  plants  wage  distributions.  In 
calculating these correlations we use the log wages, the standard deviation of 
log wages and the log wage changes (for those remaining in the plant between 
year W and W-1). The purpose is to describe the relationship between wage levels 
and wage structures on one side and mobility on the other side.  
The correlations between average wage and exit rates are negative in the first 
years but they grew over time and for the large plant sample they are positive 
for the last two years. The correlation between average wage change and exit 
rates  fluctuates  substantially  between the  years  and  even  change  signs.  Exit 
rates are in all cases positively correlated with the standard deviation of wages 
and this correlation appears to be growing over time.   31
As for the entry rates, the correlation with the average wage is similar to that 
for exit rates; it starts out negative but is positive at the end of the period. High 
entry rates also appear to be positively correlated with wage growth as well as 
with  within  plant  wage  dispersion,  and  at  least  in  the  case  of  dispersion, 
increasingly so over time. 
Appendix A shows tables that depicts high and low level jobs separately. 
+LJK￿OHYHO￿MREV are defined as jobs paying more than the 80
th percentile of the 
wage distribution in the data and /RZ￿OHYHO￿MREV are defined as the jobs paying 
less than the 20
th percentile of the distribution. The story told by these numbers 
are essentially the same as in Table 7: both entry and exits are more common 
for low level jobs and less common for high level jobs, with a more pronounced 
pattern for entries. The main difference seems to be that the correlation between 
mobility and the plant wages, wage changes and wage dispersion all are more 
positive for high level jobs. 
This concludes the snapshots of wages and mobility. The most noteworthy 
observation is the rise in between plant wage dispersion whereas the within 
dispersion has remained largely constant. The next section takes a closer look at 
this development. 
￿￿ 7KH￿HYROXWLRQ￿RI￿WKH￿ZDJH￿VWUXFWXUH￿
Figure 7 shows the overall log wage variance throughout the time period for the 
entire economy, for the corporate sector, for the private corporate sector and for 
manufacturing. The figure clearly shows that the wage dispersion has increased 
quite consistently for all of these except for manufacturing where the dispersion 




















)LJXUH￿￿ Overall log(wage) variance. 
 
The description in the previous section suggested that differences between 
plants may play an important role in explaining the growing wage dispersion in 
Sweden since the mid-1980s. The purpose of this section is to study in some 
detail the changing role that plants have played in explaining the growing wage 
dispersion between workers in the Swedish economy.  
￿￿￿￿ :LWKLQ￿DQG￿EHWZHHQ￿SODQW￿FRPSRQHQWV￿
We start by looking at how the share of log wage variance that can be attributed 
to plant-specific factors has changed over time. Figure 8 shows that the between 
plant variance as a share of overall variance has increase steadily throughout the 
period. The development is equally visible when studying the entire economy as 
when  studying  only  the  corporate  sector.  There  is  a  steady  increase  in  the 
importance  of  plant  effects  also  when  focusing  only  on  the  manufacturing 
sector, even though the increase is less pronounced in that sector. Throughout   33
the rest of this section we will focus on plants in the corporate sector. However, 
we  will include the  entire  corporate sector  regardless  of  ownership (see  the 












1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Plant R2, all Plant R2, corporate
Plant R2, private corporate Plant R2, manufacturing
 
)LJXUH￿￿ Fraction of total variance explained by plant effects. 
 
Interestingly, it is the increase in between plant variance that makes up the 
entire increase in wage dispersion over the period. Figure 9 shows the evolution 
of within plant variance which contains a slightly cyclical pattern, but has no 






















1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Within Plants, all Within Plants, corporate
Within Plants, private corporate Within Plants, manufacturing
 
)LJXUH￿￿ Within plant variance.￿
 
It is possible that the increase in between plant variance is due to changes in 
the industry composition. Thus, in Figure 10 we decompose the between plant 
variance  in  two  parts,  between  plants  within  the  same  2-digit  industry  and 
between 2-digit industries.
10 The figure clearly shows an increase in both the 
wage variances between plants in the same industry, and between industries. 
We have also looked at the variance between plants within the same firm; this 
variance is small (since many firms just have one plant) but increasing.  
As a (very) rough formal analysis of time trends for different industries, we 
estimated time trend estimates for the entire economy as well as separately for 
all 1-digit industries. The results (not displayed) showed that all industries had 
                                                       
10 We use “reduced” 2-digit industry codes that are the lowest level at which it is possible to get 
consistent industry classifications throughout the period (new codes where issued in 1992). Thus, 
the corporate sector is divided into 39 industries.   35
positive  trends  in  between  plant  variances,  while  only  three  industries  had 
trends in within-plant variance. To further asses the role of structural change we 
have looked separately at all plants that existed in 1985 and/or 2000, as well as 
dividing these plants by employment growth rates. All the results from these 
experiments suggested that the growing difference between plants is driven by 
increased  differences  between  plants  in  the  wages  they  pay,  rather  than  by 





















1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Within Industries, between plants Between Industries
￿




The increased between-plant wage inequality may have occurred for two very 
different  reasons.  First,  it  may  be  due  to  increased  sorting  of  workers  by 
observed and unobserved skills so that high-skilled and low-skilled workers to 
an  increasing  degree  are  found  in  different  plants.  Another  possibility  is 
increased importance of “true” plant effects, such as effects operating via rent 
sharing at the plant level. For example, between plant wage dispersion is likely 
to rise if wages at the plant level become more responsive to plant-specific price 
and productivity conditions.  
To get a first look at the importance of sorting according to skill we will 
include  traditional  observable  human  capital  variables  (age,  age  squared, 
education, gender and immigrant) in a “Mincer-type” regression. The results 
from the regressions can be found in Appendix B. As already has been shown in 
e.g. Gustavsson (2006), the explanatory power of observable characteristics has 
declined over time.  
We  proceed  by  including  plant  fixed  effects  in  the  Mincer  equation  and 
calculate the fixed effects R2, defined as the fraction of total residual variance 
attributed to the plant effects. This fraction captures the additional explanatory 
power  of  plant  effects  after  controlling  for  observable  characteristics.
12  The 
results  displayed  in  Figure  11  show  that  the  plants  play  an  increasingly 
important  role  also  after  controlling  for  observable  skills:  there  is  a  trend 
increase in the fraction of residual variance attributed to plant effects. We also 
calculate  the  correlation  between  the  fixed  effects  and  the  prediction  from 
observables and take this as a measure of the degree of sorting on observables in 
order to answer the question: to what extent do individuals with high earnings 
potential work in plants with large plant effects? Figure 11 reveals an increase 
in  the  degree  of  sorting:  workers  with  favorable  observed  human  capital 
attributes show an increasing tendency to work in high paying plants. 
 
                                                       
12 The fraction is formally equivalent to what Kremer and Maskin (1996) refer to as an index of 










1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
year
R2 of plant FE:s given Xb Correlation(FE,Xb)
Within plant R2 of Xb
Note: The estimated (year-specific) model is lnW(i,j,t)=X(i,t)b(t)+FE(j,t)+e(i,j,t)
where X is education (6 dummies), age, age squared, gender and immigrant.
FE is a plant fixed effect and e the error term. For estimates, see Appendix C
 
)LJXUH￿￿￿ Plant effects when controlling for observables. 
 
How  should  these  patterns  be  interpreted?  There  is  clearly  evidence  of 
increased sorting on observed skills and there is a presumption that this also is 
associated  with  more  sorting  on  unobserved  skills.  Conclusions  about  the 
development of true plant effects are more problematic, however, since such 
conclusion  would  require  that  the  observed  human  capital  characteristics 
capture all skill differences between individuals, which seem like a rather strong 
assumption.
13 
                                                       
13 Figure 11 also show that observed human capital variables can explain less of the within-plant 
variance over time.However, using the within-estimated coefficients to calculate the between R2 
we see no evidence of a trend, suggesting that the between plant variance of observables have 
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￿￿￿￿ 3ODQW￿HIIHFWV￿DQG￿VNLOO￿OHYHOV￿
We noted already in Section 4 that the variance of log wages within a plant is 
correlated with the average log wage of that plant and that this may be reflect 
the skewness of the log wage distribution. Thus, we may be interested in the 
changing role of plants in different parts of the skill distribution. We study this 
by dividing the sample of individuals into quartiles of predicted wages from the 
estimated OLS-Mincer equations. Figure 12 shows an interesting pattern; the 
plant  effects  become  increasingly  important  for  all  quartiles  except￿ the  top 
predicted quartile.
14 Thus, it  appears that the  increasing  importance  of  plant 
effects is a feature of all parts of the skill distribution H[FHSW￿at the most highly 
skilled quartile. Plant effects were clearly most important for the highest skilled 
workers at the beginning of the time period; but at the end of the period there 
were little or no differences between different parts of the skill distribution. This 
suggests  that  changes  in  bargaining  institutions  may  have  been  a  factor  of 
importance. For white collar workers in the top of the earnings distribution there 
has  typically  been  considerable  scope  for  individual  bargaining  with  the 
employer and the national wage agreements have been less relevant for those 
workers than for other groups. A speculative interpretation of Figure 12 would 
be that a gradual erosion of the bite of national wage agreements have made 
wage setting processes more similar across skill groups, with a tendency to 
emulate practices among the workers with the highest pay. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
increased relative to the within plant variance. We interpret this as further support to the notion of 
increased sorting. 
14 It should be noted that the pattern of increased plant effect R2:s can be replicated using only 
males. Thus, it is not likely that the differences between predicted wage quartiles are driven by 














1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Plant R2, Top quartile Plant R2, Third quartile
Plant R2, Second quartile Plant R2, Bottom quartile
Quartiles of predicted wages from regressions on Education (6 dummies), Age, Age squared,
Immigration status and Gender
￿
)LJXUH￿￿￿ Fraction of variance explained by plant effects by predicted wage 
quartile in the corporate sector.￿
 
￿￿￿￿ :DJH￿FKDQJHV￿DQG￿PRELOLW\￿
So far this section has focused entirely on wage levels. However, changes in the 
variance between plants in wages may have implications for both wage changes 
and mobility. In Figure 13 we study the fraction of wage growth variance that 
can be attributed to plant effects for the different years (using only workers that 
remain in the same plant). The pattern is less obvious than when studying wage 
levels, but there is a marked shift in plant specific wage growth in the beginning 
of the 1990s. This pattern also remains after controlling for observables. The 
strongest pattern emerging from the figure is however an increased sorting on 
observables (measured as the correlation between observed human capital and 
plant  fixed  effects)  starting  in  the  mid-1990s,  where  workers  with  high 
predicted wage growth rates (e.g. young workers) increasingly sort themselves   40
to plants with high residual wage growth rates. However, it should be noted 
that,  as is evident from  Figure  13,  the  within  plant  predictive power  of  the 













1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
year
Overall Plant FE R2 Within plant R2 of Xb
R2 of plant FE:s given Xb Corr(FE, Xb)
 
Note: The overall plant R2 is the between plant variance of changes divided by total variance 
of changes in log wages. The other statistics are based on the estimated (year-specific) model  
dlnW(i,j,t)=X(i,t)b(t)+FE(j,t)+e(i,j,t) where i is for individual, j for plant and t for time (year)
X includes education (6 dummies), age, age squared, gender and immigrant.
FE is a plant fixed effect and e the error term.
 
)LJXUH￿￿￿ Real wage growth and plant effects. 
 
In Section 4 we noted what appeared to be increased wage changes for those 
that  changed  plants  relative  to  the  average  wage  change.  However,  when 
studying the time pattern throughout the period it is apparent that the difference 
is highly volatile with little evidence of a trend (in most cases the differences 
are insignificant), a picture that also remains after controlling for observable 
characteristics. What appears to be a robust pattern however is a procyclicality 
of the fraction of worker observed in the data in two consecutive years that have 
changed plants between the years (see Figure 14). The fraction changing jobs in 
















1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
year
Fraction moving Wage gain if moving
Wage gain if staying
Note:Data include only workers in plants with 25+ employees in year t and t-1. 
 ’Fraction moving’ is fraction of included workers that changed plant between t and t-1.
 
)LJXUH￿￿￿ Mobility and wage gains. 
￿￿￿￿ 7KH￿G\QDPLFV￿RI￿SODQW￿ZDJHV￿
It appears clear that wages have become more dispersed between plants in the 
cross section. In this subsection we study whether the same is true for the time 
dimension – that is, does the apparent increase in cross sectional flexibility also 
mean that average plant wages are more volatile over time?  
We have computed the year by year correlations of plant log wages. The 
correlations are displayed in Figure 15 and vary between 0.92 and 0.96 with a 
marked pro-cyclical pattern – the four years with the lowest correlations are 
1991-94 – but with no trend. Thus, plant specific wages do not IOXFWXDWH more in 
2000 than they did in 1985, even though wages are more dispersed in the cross 
section.  
A main drawback of our data is the lack of information on productivity at the 
plant level. It is not possible, therefore, to examine how plant wages respond to 
changes in value productivity. However, since our results show that wages do 
not fluctuate more, but are more dispersed in the cross section, it is suggested   42
that either wages do not follow productivity more closely now (on a year by 
year basis at least), RU￿wages follow productivity more, but the time-variability 

















1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Rank correlation Correlation of plant log wages
 
)LJXUH￿￿￿ Year to year correlations of plant log wages. 
￿￿ 'LVFXVVLRQ￿
We have documented a continuous increase in between-plant wage inequality 
since the mid-1980s. This increase holds in the raw data but also after controls 
for observable human capital attributes. It holds within industries as well as 
between  plants  in  different  industries.  It  is  also  interesting  to  note  that  the 
development is visible in all parts of the (observed) skill distribution except for 
the most highly skilled workers.    43
How can this development be explained? One possibility is increased sorting 
of workers by skill. Other possibilities revolve around rent sharing and what we 
have  referred  to  as  true  plant  effects.  Suppose  that  wage  negotiations  have 
gradually become more decentralized, with increased bargaining power for local 
unions. This could cause an increase in wage dispersion as wages adjust to plant 
level productivity, recognizing that plant productivity levels typically are much 
more dispersed than wages. Another twist on the rent sharing theme is that the 
dispersion of plant productivity has increased, something that would translate 
into more wage dispersion to the extent that there is some scope for rent sharing 
at the plant level. We discuss these possibilities in turn. 
￿￿￿￿ 6RUWLQJ￿E\￿VNLOO￿
The segregation by skill theory of Kremer and Maskin (1996) is concerned with 
the idea that a rise in the overall (mean) skill levels may be accompanied by a 
rise in wage inequality as well as a rise in segregation across plants of workers 
of  different  skills.  Key  assumptions  are  that  workers  of  different  skills  are 
imperfect  substitutes,  different  tasks  within  a  plant  are  complementary  and 
different tasks differ in the sensitivity to skill. The distribution of worker skills 
is exogenous and the competitive economy operates under constant returns. The 
equilibrium  wage  distribution  depends  on  skill  distribution  but  also  on  how 
workers of different skills are matched with one another. The model predicts 
that  a  rise  in  the  dispersion  of  the  skill  distribution  will  cause  increased 
segregation of workers. Moreover, a rise in the mean of the skill distribution 
increases wage inequality across plants when the skill distribution is sufficiently 
dispersed. 
Kremer  and  Maskin  provide  empirical  evidence  that  suggests  that 
segregation by skill has become increasingly prevalent in the US, the UK and 
France over the 1980s and the 1990s. There is furthermore some evidence, from 
data on US states, that segregation by skill is amplified by increased variance of 
skills, consistent with the theory. 
The  level  of  education  has  increased  substantially  in  Sweden  in  recent 
decades. Between 1970 and 2000, the fraction of the population with upper 
secondary  education  increased  from  30  to  50  percent  and  the  fraction  with 
tertiary education from 7 to 30 percent (Björklund et al, 2005). Has there also 
been an increase in the dispersion of education? If so, the Kremer and Maskin 
theory would predict increased segregation by skill, consistent with what we 
observe in the Swedish data.    44
We have transformed our data on education levels into years of schooling 
and computed the variance of schooling using all individuals in the data. The 
results are displayed in Figure 16 and reveal a marked increase in the variance 
of schooling from the early 1990s and onwards (but a slight decline in the late 
1980s). Although this pattern is broadly consistent with the Kremer and Maskin 
theory,  the  exercise  does  certainly  not  demonstrate  a  causal  relationship 
between the dispersion of education and segregation of workers by observed 
and  unobserved  skill,  or  between  the  dispersion  of  skills  and  between-plant 
wage inequality. At the very least the results suggest that future work on the 
sources of increased wage inequality in Sweden should explore how changes in 
the level and dispersion of schooling have affected employers’ incentives to 























1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000
Year
Years of schooling calculated as: Less than compulsury: 8 years, compulsury: 9 years,  
2-year high school: 11 years, 3-year high school 12 years, some university: 13 years,  
university 15 years, graduate studies 19 years 
Data is for the entire Swedish population aged 16-65 each year
 
)LJXUH￿￿￿ Variance in years of schooling. 
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￿￿￿￿ 'HFHQWUDOL]DWLRQ￿RI￿ZDJH￿EDUJDLQLQJ￿
In  a  standard  bargaining  framework,  the  bargained  wage  is  determined  by 
“inside”  and  “outside”  factors.  The  former  include  measures  of  the  plant’s 
ability to pay, the latter overall labor market conditions. Imagine a plant-level 
wage negotiation between an employer and a local union. The stronger the local 
union is, the more responsive would the bargained wage be with respect to the 
plant’s ability to pay. The power of the local union will be constrained not only 
by a strong bargaining position of the employer but also by a central union that 
is able to strike wage agreements at the national or industry level. The more 
centralized the wage bargaining system, the weaker the links between plant-
specific  productivity  factors  and  wage  agreements  at  the  local  level.  And 
conversely, the less centralized the bargaining system, the more scope for local 
rent sharing.  
A number of studies have examined this hypothesis using data on plants or 
industries.
15 By and large, most studies find that rent sharing has been of limited 
importance in Sweden. There is so far little hard evidence that increasingly 
decentralized wage negotiations have changed this pattern. Forslund and Lindh 
(2004) used plant data for Swedish mining and manufacturing and looked at the 
cross-sectional  relationship  between  plant  wages  and  plant  productivity, 
measured as the nominal value added per employee. In regressions for each year 
for the period 1970-96 they related log wages to log productivity. The estimated 
coefficient  on  productivity  was  closely  centered  on  0.05.  The  mean  of  the 
estimates was 0.055 for the period 1970-82 and 0.051 for the period 1983-96. 
The authors report that panel data regressions produce similar estimates. There 
is no indication in this study that wages have become more responsive to plant 
level productivity despite the fact that wage negotiations arguably have become 
more decentralized since the mid-1980s. Unfortunately, since our data do not 
include any plant level productivity measures it is not possible to shed new light 
on this hypothesis.  
 
                                                       
15 Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) exploit industry data  whereas firm data are used by  Arai 
(2003), Forslund (1994), and Forslund and Lindh (2004).   46
￿￿￿￿ 3URGXFW￿PDUNHWV￿DQG￿DELOLW\￿WR￿SD\￿
An increase in the productivity dispersion across plants may cause an increase 
in between-plant wage inequality as long as there is some scope for local rent 
sharing. The recent paper by Dunne et al (2004) brings new evidence on this 
issue in a study of wage and productivity dispersion in US manufacturing. The 
study exploits establishment data over the 1975-92 period and finds that almost 
all of the increase in hourly wage dispersion is accounted for by an increase in 
the  between-plant  component.  Interestingly,  the  study  also  documents  an 
increase in the between-plant distribution of productivity over the same period. 
Moreover,  wages  and  productivity  at  the  plant  level  are  strongly  positively 
correlated, both in levels and changes. The paper also finds that an important 
source  of  the  rise  in  wage  and  productivity  dispersion  between  plants  is 
accounted  for  by  changes  in  the  distribution  of  computer  investment  across 
plants. 
Data on the evolution of the productivity dispersion across Swedish plants 
are  rare.  Some  information  in  offered  by  Forslund  and  Lindh  (2004)  who 
computed  a  productivity  measure  (the  standard  deviation  of  log  value 
productivity) for mining and manufacturing. Interestingly, there is a trend rise in 
productivity dispersion, especially from the early 1980s and onwards. To the 
extent that this development holds for the private sector as a whole, it may help 
explain the rise in between plant wage inequality. 
￿
￿￿ &RQFOXGLQJ￿UHPDUNV￿
The paper has provided new evidence on the evolution of wage dispersion in 
Sweden with particular focus on dispersion within and between plants. We use 
linked employer-employee data and find a striking trend increase in between 
plant wage inequality since the mid-1980s. Interestingly, this trend in between 
plant variance makes up the entire increase in wage dispersion over the period.  
The increase in wage dispersion between plants is present in the raw data but 
also when we control for workers’ human capital characteristics. Thus, sorting 
by observed characteristics can only explain part of the increase. We find that 
the basic pattern holds within industries as well as between plants in different 
industries. Also, increasing between plant wage dispersion has been substantial 
throughout the individual wage distribution, except for individuals at the top of   47
the distribution. Overall, our results suggest that the growing difference between 
plants is driven by increased differences between plants in the wages they pay, 
rather than by changes in the composition of plants in the economy.  
It  lies  close  at  hand  to  suspect  that  a  gradual  evolution  towards  more 
decentralized wage bargaining practices is a factor of importance. Our data are 
however  not  rich  enough  to  test  alternative  hypotheses  concerning  the 
mechanisms behind the rise in wage inequality between plants. It is premature, 
therefore, to identify the causes of the rise in between plant wage inequality. To 
make progress on this front we need more information on plant characteristics, 
and in particular measures of (value) productivity at the plant level.    48
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$SSHQGL[￿$￿￿0RELOLW\￿RI￿KLJK￿DQG￿ORZ￿
OHYHO￿MREV￿
7DEOH￿$￿ Mobility, high level jobs (continues). 
  All plants     Plants with 100+ employees  
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
Number of plants  6783  8025  7137  8475    1338  1560  1418  1640 
Employees  100.6  98.4  101.7  99.1    311.6  303.8  315.4  302.6 
  (s.d.)  236.1  226.1  224.5  213.2    474.7  456.8  441.5  425.5 
Employment growth  0.016  0.029  0.057  0.062    0.002  -0.005  0.051  0.040 
  (s.d.)  0.243  0.247  0.230  0.327    0.171  0.160  0.193  0.249 
Exit rate, REVHUY￿ ￿
SHUVRQ 
0.136  0.149  0.136  0.182    0.133  0.153  0.131  0.197 
Exit rate  0.141  0.158  0.144  0.190    0.125  0.152  0.130  0.191 
  (s.d.)  0.202  0.210  0.206  0.237    0.140  0.150  0.139  0.179 
Exit rate, top quartile 
of plant wages 
0.167  0.183  0.179  0.220    0.161  0.190  0.182  0.239 
  (s.d.)  0.285  0.293  0.293  0.320    0.201  0.213  0.213  0.259 
Exit rate, bottom 
quartile of firm wages 
0.128  0.147  0.128  0.177    0.113  0.128  0.105  0.159 
  (s.d.)  0.249  0.266  0.252  0.282    0.185  0.188  0.184  0.217 
Exit rate, top decile of 
firm wages 
0.186  0.204  0.208  0.239    0.188  0.229  0.236  0.279 
  (s.d.)  0.339  0.352  0.353  0.375    0.263  0.288  0.291  0.333 
Exit rate, bottom 
decile of firm wages 
0.141  0.156  0.122  0.192    0.115  0.130  0.095  0.170 
  (s.d.)  0.289  0.301  0.267  0.323    0.233  0.233  0.196  0.269 
Entry rate  0.116  0.129  0.128  0.169    0.107  0.114  0.118  0.167 
  (s.d.)  0.183  0.191  0.197  0.227    0.133  0.136  0.138  0.181 
Entry rate, top quartile 
of firm wages 
0.130  0.147  0.146  0.181    0.126  0.148  0.151  0.191 
  (s.d.)  0.253  0.268  0.271  0.300    0.182  0.202  0.208  0.243 
Entry rate, bottom 
quartile of firm wages 
0.117  0.125  0.122  0.179    0.102  0.096  0.105  0.149 
  (s.d.)  0.241  0.244  0.242  0.289    0.182  0.163  0.182  0.221 
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7DEOH￿$￿ Mobility, high level jobs (continued). 
  All plants     Plants with 100+ employees  
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
Entry rate, top decile 
of firm wages 
0.144  0.160  0.159  0.194    0.152  0.171  0.180  0.222 
  (s.d.)  0.304  0.320  0.321  0.347    0.243  0.260  0.273  0.311 
Entry rate, bottom 
decile of firm wages 
0.128  0.141  0.139  0.200    0.094  0.095  0.111  0.154 
  (s.d.)  0.279  0.289  0.285  0.330    0.201  0.201  0.209  0.254 
% of workers with 5+ 
years of tenure 
--  0.452  0.485  0.447    --  0.472  0.529  0.468 
  (s.d.)    0.344  0.355  0.347      0.310  0.308  0.299 
Correlation (exit rate, 
average wage),  
0.105  0.106  0.134  0.158    0.174  0.117  0.196  0.193 
Correlation(exit rate, 
average wage change)  
0.045  0.047  0.072  0.131    0.074  0.084  0.121  0.141 
Correlation(exit rate, 
s.d. of wage)  
0.072  0.109  0.120  0.161    0.096  0.074  0.146  0.117 
Correlation (entry rate, 
average wage),  
0.103  0.129  0.150  0.165    0.088  0.165  0.229  0.182 
Correlation(entry rate, 
average wage change),  
0.027  0.044  0.056  0.090    0.084  0.085  0.069  0.083 
Correlation(entry rate, 
s.d. of wage),  
0.087  0.128  0.117  0.129    0.037  0.141  0.118  0.122 
Note:  High  level  jobs  are  jobs  with  wages  above  the  80th  percentile  of  the  sample  wage 
distribution All statistics are at the plant level with one plant as one observation except otherwise 
noted. Tables for all jobs can be found in the text. Correlations are with average log wages in 
plants, average log wage changes for workers remaining in the plant, and standard deviation of 
log wages within plants. 
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7DEOH￿$￿￿Mobility, low level jobs (continues). 
  All Plants     Plants with 100+ employees  
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
Number of plants  6964  8195  7415  8868    1340  1565  1420  1650 
Employees  99.1  97.2  99.4  96.4    311.6  303.2  315.3  301.6 
  (s.d.)  233.3  223.9  220.6  208.8    474.4  456.1  441.2  424.4 
Employment growth  0.016  0.028  0.057  0.060    0.001  -0.006  0.051  0.040 
  (s.d.)  0.242  0.246  0.228  0.320    0.172  0.160  0.193  0.249 
Exit  rate,  REVHUY￿  ￿
SHUVRQ 
0.394  0.395  0.270  0.346    0.376  0.387  0.246  0.319 
Exit rate  0.387  0.382  0.286  0.345    0.369  0.377  0.258  0.321 
  (s.d.)  0.212  0.216  0.219  0.233    0.135  0.138  0.146  0.160 
Exit  rate,  top  quartile 
of firm wages 
0.303  0.318  0.217  0.276    0.257  0.290  0.168  0.230 
  (s.d.)  0.314  0.316  0.296  0.318    0.189  0.191  0.181  0.207 
Exit  rate,  bottom 
quartile of firm wages 
0.521  0.485  0.393  0.456    0.525  0.496  0.385  0.460 
  (s.d.)  0.353  0.352  0.349  0.352    0.209  0.214  0.231  0.245 
Exit rate, top decile of 
firm wages 
0.291  0.306  0.208  0.272    0.249  0.274  0.159  0.226 
  (s.d.)  0.385  0.387  0.352  0.380    0.247  0.255  0.224  0.267 
Exit  rate,  bottom 
decile of firm wages 
0.579  0.537  0.443  0.517    0.584  0.545  0.451  0.518 
  (s.d.)  0.409  0.413  0.411  0.415    0.312  0.313  0.320  0.321 
Entry rate  0.428  0.463  0.417  0.463    0.393  0.414  0.378  0.424 
  (s.d.)  0.239  0.239  0.256  0.264    0.167  0.162  0.181  0.201 
Entry rate, top quartile 
of firm wages 
0.333  0.375  0.320  0.361    0.280  0.319  0.273  0.309 
  (s.d.)  0.336  0.345  0.347  0.359    0.210  0.216  0.237  0.262 
Entry rate, bottom 
quartile of firm wages 
0.544  0.568  0.541  0.583    0.510  0.515  0.500  0.538 
  (s.d.)  0.357  0.355  0.358  0.356    0.234  0.230  0.238  0.263 
Entry rate, top decile 
of firm wages 
0.318  0.364  0.305  0.347    0.262  0.300  0.259  0.285 
  (s.d.)  0.400  0.414  0.402  0.417    0.264  0.276  0.282  0.306 
Entry rate, bottom 
decile of firm wages 
0.570  0.604  0.585  0.618    0.523  0.538  0.546  0.567 
  (s.d.)  0.413  0.407  0.409  0.405    0.328  0.323  0.322  0.332   53
7DEOH￿$￿￿Mobility, low level jobs (continued). 
  All Plants     Plants with 100+ employees  
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
% of workers with 5+ 
years of tenure 
--  0.137  0.235  0.203    --  0.170  0.278  0.262 
  (s.d.)    0.169  0.232  0.222      0.147  0.196  0.210 
Correlation (exit rate, 
average wage),  
-0.175  -0.139  -0.186  -0.217    -0.123  -0.069  -0.229  -0.249 
Correlation(exit rate, 
average wage change)  
-0.015  -0.048  -0.024  -0.020    -0.044  -0.084  -0.014  -0.073 
Correlation(exit rate, 
s.d. of wage)  
0.044  0.053  0.076  0.099    0.061  -0.014  0.064  0.162 
Correlation (entry rate, 
average wage),  
-0.153  -0.116  -0.122  -0.148    -0.177  -0.058  -0.069  -0.168 
Correlation(entry rate, 
average wage change),  
0.110  0.083  0.132  0.130    0.225  0.215  0.252  0.139 
Correlation(entry rate, 
s.d. of wage),  
0.045  0.033  0.055  0.079    -0.015  -0.002  -0.053  0.021 
Note:  Low  level  jobs  are  jobs  with  wages  below  the  20th  percentile  of  the  sample  wage 
distribution All statistics are at the plant level with one plant as one observation except otherwise 
noted. Tables for all jobs can be found in the text. Correlations are with average log wages in 
plants, average log wage changes for workers remaining in the plant, and standard deviation of 
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$SSHQGL[￿%￿0LQFHU￿HTXDWLRQ￿HVWLPDWHV￿
 
7DEOH￿%￿ OLS Mincer equation results for corporate sector workers in 25+ sized plants. 
￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
2-year  High 
school   0.052  0.056  0.057  0.057  0.059  0.064  0.072  0.062  0.064  0.062  0.059  0.060  0.058  0.053  0.052  0.048 
3-year  High 
school  0.159  0.163  0.164  0.158  0.160  0.166  0.173  0.161  0.165  0.163  0.154  0.159  0.157  0.156  0.161  0.161 
Some univ.  0.210  0.216  0.222  0.223  0.225  0.233  0.241  0.230  0.235  0.235  0.232  0.246  0.252  0.257  0.271  0.277 
3-year univ.  0.403  0.421  0.425  0.430  0.421  0.429  0.441  0.431  0.429  0.435  0.427  0.437  0.438  0.441  0.452  0.458 
Post grad.  0.561  0.578  0.578  0.598  0.582  0.588  0.592  0.584  0.576  0.556  0.565  0.552  0.549  0.552  0.565  0.617 
Age  0.041  0.040  0.041  0.042  0.041  0.041  0.039  0.033  0.035  0.040  0.040  0.041  0.043  0.044  0.044  0.044 
age^2*100  -0.041  -0.040  -0.041  -0.042  -0.041  -0.041  -0.038  -0.032  -0.034  -0.039  -0.040  -0.040  -0.042  -0.044  -0.044  -0.044 
Female  -0.206  -0.192  -0.201  -0.216  -0.211  -0.213  -0.215  -0.206  -0.214  -0.219  -0.219  -0.215  -0.211  -0.207  -0.199  -0.197 
Immigrant  -0.051  -0.056  -0.062  -0.070  -0.076  -0.082  -0.073  -0.058  -0.057  -0.058  -0.061  -0.064  -0.069  -0.074  -0.090  -0.097 
Constant  8.158  8.238  8.287  8.323  8.439  8.526  8.640  8.810  8.801  8.735  8.769  8.809  8.804  8.815  8.825  8.865 
5￿VTXDUHG￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Note: All estimates are significant at the 1 % significance level (all standard errors are 0.003 or less). Reference for education is “less than high school”. 
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7DEOH￿%￿ Plant fixed-effects Mincer equation results for corporate sector workers in 25+ sized plants. 
  ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
2-year  High 
school  
0.042  0.045  0.045  0.045  0.047  0.050  0.053  0.049  0.049  0.048  0.046  0.048  0.046  0.042  0.039  0.036 
3-year  High 
school 
0.122  0.125  0.124  0.119  0.121  0.123  0.126  0.119  0.119  0.117  0.110  0.115  0.113  0.112  0.112  0.111 
Some univ.  0.154  0.160  0.163  0.165  0.167  0.172  0.176  0.168  0.169  0.169  0.164  0.172  0.176  0.177  0.182  0.184 
3-year univ.  0.326  0.343  0.342  0.347  0.338  0.339  0.347  0.339  0.335  0.340  0.329  0.334  0.331  0.328  0.325  0.321 
Post grad.  0.490  0.507  0.503  0.523  0.505  0.507  0.513  0.508  0.500  0.505  0.489  0.493  0.485  0.482  0.483  0.490 
Age  0.038  0.037  0.038  0.039  0.038  0.038  0.035  0.031  0.032  0.036  0.037  0.037  0.040  0.041  0.040  0.040 
age^2*100  -0.038  -0.037  -0.037  -0.038  -0.037  -0.037  -0.034  -0.029  -0.030  -0.034  -0.036  -0.036  -0.039  -0.040  -0.039  -0.039 
Female  -0.216  -0.205  -0.214  -0.224  -0.218  -0.220  -0.221  -0.211  -0.219  -0.219  -0.215  -0.210  -0.207  -0.203  -0.197  -0.194 
Immigrant  -0.056  -0.059  -0.064  -0.070  -0.077  -0.078  -0.068  -0.056  -0.052  -0.052  -0.055  -0.057  -0.059  -0.064  -0.068  -0.073 
Constant  8.222  8.311  8.366  8.400  8.517  8.623  8.732  8.888  8.903  8.845  8.866  8.911  8.897  8.907  8.946  8.986 
Number  of 
Plants 
8381  8680  9226  10109  10243  10552  10296  9431  9191  9816  10501  10720  10997  11575  12138  12820 
:LWKLQ￿
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&RUU￿
￿;￿E￿￿X￿￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿
Note: All estimates are significant at the 1 % significance level (all standard errors are 0.005 or less). Reference for education is “less than high school”. Estimated model is ln:=;b+X+H￿ where 






7DEOH￿&￿ Means and standard deviations of wages and wage changes. 
  Log wages     Log wage change 
  1986  1990  1995  2000    1986  1990  1995  2000 
  3ODQWV￿E\￿ZDJH￿GHFLOH    3ODQWV￿E\￿ZDJH￿FKDQJH￿GHFLOH 
> 90 %-ile plants  
Mean wage (or change)  9.690  9.753  9.845  10.068    0.128  0.092  0.137  0.156 
Average within plant sd  0.343  0.345  0.338  0.348    0.133  0.150  0.146  0.168 
45
th to 55
th %-ile plants  
Mean wage (or change)  9.376  9.440  9.505  9.666    0.051  0.006  0.036  0.046 
Average within plant sd  0.255  0.270  0.263  0.264    0.111  0.128  0.116  0.121 
< 10 %-ile plants  
Mean wage (or change)  9.178  9.213  9.249  9.411    -0.012  -0.073  -0.037  -0.034 
Average within plant sd  0.217  0.240  0.238  0.236    0.122  0.138  0.131  0.134 
￿ 3ODQWV￿E\￿GLVWDQFH￿WR￿WKH￿￿SODQW￿ZLWK￿
PHGLDQ￿ZDJH￿   
3ODQWV￿E\￿GLVWDQFH￿WR￿WKH￿SODQW￿ZLWK￿
PHGLDQ￿ZDJH￿FKDQJH 
Decile around 1 sd above 
median: 
 Mean wage (or change)  9.542  9.606  9.690  9.880    0.094  0.055  0.094  0.108 
Average within plant sd  0.317  0.317  0.313  0.324    0.124  0.138  0.139  0.152 
Decile around 1 sd below 
median: 
Mean wage (or change)  9.250  9.302  9.351  9.504    0.013  -0.040  -0.012  -0.007 
Average within plant sd  0.228  0.253  0.239  0.247    0.116  0.131  0.121  0.128 
N: Plants by decile.  704  831  753  906    704  831  753  906 
Note: All statistics are at the plant level with one plant as one observation and calculated for one 
decile in the distribution of plant wages (left-hand side) or in the distribution of wage changes 
(right-hand side).  :RUN￿LQ￿SURJUHVV￿￿￿GR￿QRW￿TXRWH￿
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7DEOH￿&￿ Exit rates in plants with compressed and dispersed wages. 
   





     
Exit rate  0.197  0.207  0.149  0.193 
Sd  0.123  0.121  0.114  0.132 
Exit rate in top within-plant decile  0.127  0.142  0.123  0.158 
Sd  0.182  0.187  0.175  0.200 
Exit rate in bottom within-plant decile  0.456  0.432  0.340  0.389 





     
Exit rate  0.209  0.228  0.174  0.238 
Sd  0.125  0.128  0.127  0.149 
Exit rate in top within-plant decile   0.165  0.185  0.184  0.236 
Sd  0.204  0.215  0.220  0.245 
Exit rate in bottom within-plant decile  0.452  0.431  0.341  0.406 
Sd  0.270  0.270  0.268  0.284 
Note: All statistics are at the plant level with one plant as one observation and calculated for one 
decile in the distribution of plant wages (first half) or in the distribution of wage changes (second 
half).  
 